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Theoretical investigations of the market exchange from the game-
theoretic point of view has two representative approaches. One is
the cooperative market exchange model. In the celebrated game-the-
oretic formulation of the Edgeworth's conjecture by the work of
Debreu and Scarf [1], exchange economy without the price mecha-
nism is considered and in this economy, exchange is understood as .
a redistribution of resources among the traders in a way, starting
from the initial allocation, increases at least one trader's utility
without diminishing the other traders' utilities, and competition is
regarded as the process of eliminating dominated allocations by con-
tracting and recontracting. In this cooperative market game, the
solution concept is the core which is not improved upon by any co-
alitional redistribution of resources. They does not consider the
price-mediated exchange economy and rather they derive theoretical
justifications of the Edgeworth's Law in the form: as the number
of participants approaches infinity, the core allocation coincides
with the one of competitive equilibrium. After their work, cooper-
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ative market game models. in most cases, virtually ignore the as-
pect of price-mediated exchange.
The other is the noncooperative market· exchange model which
was motivated and suggested by the works of Shapley [3J and
Shapley and Shubik [4]. Recently, in succession to these works.
several interesting papers are posed. e. g., Schmeidler [2J and
Wilson [SJetc. Their contentions commonly focus upon the critique
for the theoretical lacuna of the standard Walrasian model: the
essential nature of the Walrasian theoretical explanation consists
in the treatment of the coordination of activities at the level of
market, however, the explanation of the market itself is incomplete.
that is. the process or rules by which prices are determined is not
explicit. They analyze the market exchange from the noncoopera-
tive game-theoretic point of view with explicitly treating the effect
of agents' bidding behaviour upon the market price formation.
In this article, we will formulate the noncooperative bidding game
in the monetary exchange economy. We will consider a pure mone-
tary exchange economy: we suppose that any trade must be an ex-
change of money against some other commodity. The j-th market is
the one in which the commodity j is exchanged against money. In
each .market each agent submits his price and net trade offer. Every
trade is carried out among the members who bid the same price in
a manner that anyone is not forced to trade beyond his wishes. We
assume that each agent's characteristics such as his preference and
endowment are known to him only and there is no way for any agent
to observe his characteristics. however we assume. that every agent
has a complete market information such as the list of net trade
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vector and the list of price vector bade by every agent. By these
formulation we will examine the properties of the solution concepts
of this game, and we give an interpretation of the .Walras equilib-
rium from the viewpoint of a noncooperative game with explicitly
treating the effect of each agent's bidding behaviour upon the mar-
ket price formation.
I. Analytical Framework
Let t = I (Zi. 2 to wJ /E I. J) denote an exchange economy with a
finite set of consumers 1= jili =1.2..... n) and a set of commod-
ities J= !j!J=O.1;2, .... m). The commodity 0 is called money.
which is a medium of exchange and is in itself a consumable com-
modity.. Z;,C Rm+, denotes consumer i's feasible set of net trade
(excess demand) vector. 2/ denotes his preference ordering. and
WI denotes his initial endowment of commodities. Concerning to the
characteristics of each consumer we assume the following;
Assumption 1: Zi is closed, convex and has a lower bound for
~ and 0 E Zi,
Assumption 2: initial endowment vector Wi is positive. and
Assumption 3: preference ordering 2, is strictly convex, monotone
and continuous and it is a complete preordering. Furthurmore the
indifference surface is smooth on Z,.
We will consider the economy which is characterized by the fol-
lowing theoretical hypotheses.
[H-l] We consider a pure monetary exchange economy; we suppose
that any trade must be an exchange of money against some other
commodity. So there are in markets and the j-th market is the one
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in which the commodity j is exchanged against the commodity 0
(money) .
[H-2]We denote consumer i's strategy vector by SI and suppose
that SI= (pl.ZI)' pl= (p\, 1. pL1 •... ,p:.,1)ER2•mdenotes the price
vector bade by the consumer i . where p~ is the price of commod-
ity j which is measured in terms of commodity O. In the j-th mar-
ket, the consumer i submits the pair of (p> 1) and Z I (j) = (z ij,
ZIO(j)). where Zlj denotes his net trade of commodity j and zw(j)
denotes his net trade of commodity 0 in the j -th market. Concern-
ing to the pair of (p ~. 1) and z 1(j) we suppose that the consumer i
must satisfy the condition P>U+ZlO(j) =0. We define Zi= (Zn,
ZIO(l). Zi2. zlO(2) •...• Zim. zlO(m))ER2m. Hence the consumer i's
strategy set S I is defined by
Si= ISi= (pl,d I (Vj =FO): (p~ £;0), (Vj =FO): (P;ZIJ+ZW(j) =0) I·
[H-3]The trading rule in the j-th market is characterized by the
mapping]];jJ: (sILEJ ~(Z~(j))IE" where (sILEJ is the list of
strategies and z~(j)= (z~1> z~o{J)) is consumer i's realized net
trade vector in the j -th market. In the following we denote
] 1 a(,)J = ZI J . The trading rule which is considered here is sum-
marized by the following characteristics of the mapping ]]: for
any consumer k and any j -th market, when the list of strategies
(s I) iE 1= S is given,
[iJ if #{ilp~=p;}=l. 1;(s) =0,
[ii] if # {ilp~=pjl£;2, we define the set J(p;) = {ilpJ=pfl,
and then, (ViE S C.!-(pn): U!(s) = Zi{J) = (Zlj, z/O{J))),
(ViE L C.I(pt) ) : Uf(s) = - (~=IE sZij/L.IELZli ) ZI(j)).
where S={iE.I(p;)IZljL.IE.I(p;)zli~Olandit denotes the set
- 80 -
M. Maruyama. Noncooperative Price-Mediated Exchange 243
of consumers who belong to the short side of the j-th market at
the price pr, and L= {iE,F(p;lIZ'jL:'E .f(pk)Zii>Oj and it de-
notes the set of consumers who be long to the long side of the j -th ,
market at the price p;. That is, we suppose that in any j -th
market every trade is carried out among the members who bid the
same, price and in which any consumer i who belongs to the short
side of the market can carry out his trading offer Z i (j). but any
agent who belongs to the long side of the ,market is forced to trade
z~(j) *-Zi(j). We define the mapping J= fiJi. where J: (SJiE/f-+
J
(z~) i E I and we denote the i -th element of this mapping as
1'= z~ER2m.
[H-4] We suppose that each consumer receives the whole of the
market information such as the list of price vectors bade by every
agent. the list of net trade offer. and the list of realized net trade
of every consumer. Furthermore 'We suppose that every consumer
knows the trading rule. However, we assume that each consumer's
characteristics such as his .preference and endowment are known to
him only and there is no way for any consumer to observe his char-
acteristics. So we suppose that every trading is carried out in
the noncooperative game manner.
II. On the trading Rule
In this section we will consider the property of the trading rule
f Before the analysis we will define the following mappings 0, y
for any consumer i. and the mapping 17::
- 81 -
244
zlO(m) ) E R' m. and
O(ZJ=(Zil' Zi2,"" Z'm. L,j=~ziO(j))ER"!+\.
mapping Y:Zi(j)\--'Y(Zi(j), where ZI(j)=(W, zlo(j») and
Y(Zi(j) = (0, 0•... , Zij' 0, ... , O,z·IO(j))ERm." and
mapping rr: P \--. rr(p), where P = (PI> 1, p,. 1, ... , pm, 1) E R~m and
rr(p) = (PI' p" . .. , pm, 1) E R~+I.
Definition 1: The trading rule f is called reasonable if it sat-
isfies the following conditions: for any consumer i
(i] if (Vj =\=0): (Y(ZI(/)) EZi ), and, O(ZI) EZi , then o(z~) EZI ,
[iiJ if ('I1j=\=O): (Y(ZI(j)) + w 1 21 WI) and o(ZJ+WiCIW/,
then o(Z~)+WICiWI'
[iiiJ rr(p) o(z~) = 0, and
livJ L,IEIO(Z~)=O.
The condition [i] implies that the outcome given by the trading
rule f is feasible, when the consumer submits a feasible net trade.
The condition [iii] means the budgetary feasibi Iity of the outcome.
The condition [ii] is ca.lled an individual rationality, that is, any
consumer will not be worse off after the trade when he plans to
be better off by the trade. The condition [iv) implies the balance
of the outcome. Thp.se four conditions may be the natural require-
ments for the trading rule in the price-mediated exchange economy.
Schmeidler's model [2) is not reasonable in the sense of Defini-
tion 1, because it may violate the requirement [il, i. e., the feasi-
bility of the outcome. Hence his model is not a satisfactory de-
scription of the price-mediated exchange economy. Here we can
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show that the our trading rule is reasonable.
Proposition 1: The trading rule f is reasonable.
Proof; At first, it is trivial that the trading rule f satisfies
the condition l iv]. Next, by noting the definition of the trading
rule, it follows that
(ViE]); (Vj'*-O) : (z~(j) = (z~j' z~o(j») = ~, (Zjj' zw(j», where
~ is a real number such that 0 ~ a~ ~ 1. From the definition of
mappings 8 andy, we have 8(z~) = L.j<':'djY(ZI(j»).
When (Vj'*-O): (~=O) for some consumer i, his outcome 8(z~) =0.
Then it is easily shown that conditions li], [ii], and [iii] are all
satisfied for this consumer i. When (3j,*-0): (~,*-O), we define
CrJ = a;/L.j.,:,a;. Then it follows that 0 ~ ~ ~ 1, L.j"':'~= 1, and
8(zn/L.i ':'ctj = L.j'':'~ Y(Zj(j », that is, 8(z~)/L.j,':'a~ IS a convex
linear combination of Y(Zj(j». From this fact and the convexity of
the set Zl and the 'convexity of the preference Zt it is easily ver-
ified that the trading rule f satisfies the conditions ri] and [ii].
Finally, from the definition of the strategy set 5, we have
('Vj,*-O); (pJz'j+ zw(j) =0), hence from the definition of the trad-
ing rule we have ('II j '*- 0) : (pJz~j + z~() (j) = 0). So it follows that
1r(p) 8 (z~) =L.j<':'(p~Z~j+ z~()(j» =0. These considerations com-
plete the proof. II
ill. Walras Equilibrium as Nash Equilibrium
In usual the solution concept of the noncooperative game is a
Nash equilibrium. In this section we will examine the relation of
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the equilibrium of our game and a Walras equilibrium.
Definition 2: When the list of strategies (StltEI= s* is given.
s:(s*) is called a Nash strategy of consumer k. if the following
condition is satisfied:
(Vs.ES.):(8(j·(sZ(s*).s~,))+w.2.8(jK(S•• s:, ))+w.))._
where s,., denotes the list of strategies of n-l consumers other
than consumer k.
Definition 3: The list of strategies (s~) iEJ= s* is called a
Nash equilibrium if (ViEl): (s7(s*)= s~). We call the list of strat-
egies (s~) tEl = S * a nontrivial Nash equilibrium if (s~) i E J = S *
is a Nash equilibrium and (Vj=FO): (3iEl): (j} (s*) =FO).
Definition 4: The list of strategies (stl iE I= S * is called a non-
trivial Walras equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:
fi 1 (ViEl): (st= (P. Zt) and 8(['(s *)) = Zt(1T(p))).
Iii] (Vj=FO): (3iEl): (Ztj(1T(p)) =FO).
where Zt (1T(p)) is consumer ts Walrasian net trade vector at the
price vector 7C(p) = (PI' P, • ... , Pm, 1). that is, we define the budget
set B i = !ZtERm+ll1T(p)Zt=O, ZiEZ;j, then z,(1T(p))EBt and
(Vz i EBL! : (Zt(1T(p) ) + Wi 2i Zi + W t ).
Let P(j) denote the set of price vectors p (j) = (P j , 1) which
prevail in the j-th market and enable someone to trade. We define
the set Pby P= l(p(j))j.~()I(Vj=FO):(p(j)EP(j))j,
where (p(j))j ~()= (p\,1.p,.1 •... 'Pm.1) ER',m.
Definition 5: We call the state of the economy regular at P if
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the following conditions are satisfied for any consumer k and in any
A
j -th market: for any pEP which is chosen by the consumer k,
if i.j(Tr(p)) >0, then lL:iE.I(p(j))zljl>i.j(Tr(p))
if i.j(Tr(p)) <0, then L:iE.I(p(j))Z;j> li.j(Tr(p))I,
where .I (p (j )) denotes the set of consumers who bid the price vec-
tor p (j) corresponding to the price vector pEP which is chosen by
the consumer k, and Zlj = min (Zij, 0), z1 j = max (2'lj, 0).
Definition 6: The list of strategies (sri IE I = s* is called a
nontrivial and regular Nash eq,uilibrium, if s * is a nontrivial Nash
equilibrium and the state of the economy corresponding to s* is
regular.
Remark: When the economy consists of a few consumers, in general,
the regular property' may be violated. The economy which sat-
isfies the regular property may be the one which consist" vi nu-
merous consumers, each consumer's transaction is sufficiently
small relative to the aggregate volume of transaction and there ex-
ists a similarity of bidding behaviour between consumers.
Lemma 1: At a nontrivial and regular Nash eq,uilibrium there
prevails unique price vector.
Proof: Let the Jist of strategies (sf) IE 1= s* be a nontrivial
and regular Nash eq,uilibrium. Then from Definition 3 we have
('Vj~ 0): (]iEI): U/ (s*) ~O). Hence in each market there prevail
price vectors which enable someone to trade. Let P{j) be the set
of all price vectors p (j) = (p j' 1) which prevai I in the j -th market
A
and enable someone to trade. We define the set P by
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P= I (p(j) )i.."ICV"j~O): (p(j) EP(j))). When consumer i bids the
price vector pE Pand calculates his Walrasian net trade vector
Zi(1l'(P)) = (iii, i/2, ...• zo., iill) , then in any j-th market there
exist enough aggregate volume of net trade to achieve zii' because
(sn 'E 1= s* is a nontrivial and regular Nash eq,uilibrium. Then,
by noting the defini tion of the trading rule consumer i can se lect
(z'i' zw(j)) whose outcome coincides with (i'i' i,.(j)), where
i lu (j) = - Pi iii' Hence we have
('ViE [) : ('VpE?) : OSI = (p, Zt)) : (a(j' (s" s,*t,)) = it (1l'(p»).
We must note this fact.
We must show that #P=l. We prove itby reductio ad absurdum.
Let pEP and define the set J = lilp'=p). Suppose that
(3kE[): (kEE}). Let p"'4;=p denote the price vector bade by con-
sumer k and pOE?~ Then the set !o(z)I1l'(p) a(z) =0) is divided
by the set lo(z)!1l'(p") o(z) =o} into
!o(z)!1l'(p) o(z) =0, 1l'(p') o(z) 60) and
(O(z)I1l'(p) o(z) =0, 1l'(p') 0(;) ~Ol.
Now L.'EI o(f'(s*)) =0, because of the fact that L.iE. I(s*) =0.
Then it follows that (3 iEl) : (1l'(pk) o(j' (s*») ~ 0).
(a) When 1l'(p') O(ji (s*» < 0,
we have Zt(1l'(p"» +Wt>tO(jI(S*» +w t . However, from the above
remark we have
('ViEl) : ('VpE?) : (3 Sl = (p, Zt) : (0(1 (s" S~I'» = Zt (1l'(p) »).
This cotradicts the suppositi on of s*.
(b) When 1l'(pk)O(ji(S*» =0, it follows that
(3 z E Rm• , ) : (1l'(p) Z = 0, 1l'(p') Z < 0, Z + WI 6 0). Then we can find
a scalar f3> 0 such that 1l'(p')(z + f31l'(p» = O. Hence we have
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n:(p)(z+(3n:(p)) >0 and n:(p")(z+(3n:(p)) =0.
From the Assumption 3 of the preference ordering we have
(:3 ! E (0,1» : (t (z + (3n: (p) ) + (1- t) 0 (j' (s *) ) + WI> I 0 (ji (s *) ) + Wi) .
This result contradicts the supposition that (si) iEI is a nontrivial
Nash equilibrium. This completes the proof. II
Theorem 1: In our noncooperative bidding game the nontrivial
and regular Nash equilibrium coincides with the nontrivial Walras
equilibrium.
Proof: (Nash equilibrium-Walras equilibrium); Let the list
of strategies (st) IE I = s* be a nontrivial and regular Nash equilib-
rium. . From Lemma 1, we know that there prevails unique price
vector. Hence we can denote (ViE!): (s,*=(p, z,*))
From the definition of nontrivial Nash equilibrium it follows that
(Vj*O): (jiEI):U;(s*) *0). Then from the regular property and
the definition of the trading rule we have
We know the fact that
L:..'E If' (s *) = O. Hence we have
L:..,.jS{f'(s *)) =L:..'EIZ,(n:(P)) =0. This result implies that unique
prevailing price vector trip) is a Walrasian equilibrium one. Fur-
~hermore from the supposition that (V j* 0): (3iE[): U/(s*) *0) it
follows directly that (Vj*O) : (3i E I): (if (n:(p)) *0).
(Walras equilibrium-Nash equilibrium); Let the list of strategies
(sf) /E'= s* be a nontrivial Walras equilibrium. We denote
* ( *) for any consumer i. Then from the definition ofs, = p, z/
nontrivial Wains equilibrium it follows that
- 87 -
250
('\fiEf): (o(f(s*)) = zi(rr(p))) and ('\fj): (3iEI): (zij(rr(p)) *0).
We denote consumer i's Nash strategy for s* by s; (s*) = (pi, z~).
From the definition of the trading rule it is trivial that
('\fiE I) : (pi= p). Furthermore each consumer achieves his Walras-
ian net trade, that is. ('\fiE!): (o(/(s*)) = zi(rr(p))). Hence
we have ('\fiEI): (z~(s*) = zn.
These results imply that ('\fiE!): (sf(s*) = sil. Final1y, from
the supposition that ('\fj): (3 iE!) : (iij (1!'(p)) ~ 0) it follows direct-
ly that ('\fj): (3iEI): Uj(s*) *0). This completes the proof, II
N. Concluding Remark
In this article, we have formulated the noncooperative bidding
game with explicitly treating ,the effect of each agent's bidding be-
haviour upon the market price formation. We considered the mone-
tary exchange economy, which is different from Shapley [3] and
Shapley and Shubik [4], and constructed a reasonable trading rule.
Then we examined the relation between the noncooperative solution
and the Walras equilibrium. By noting the Remark the result of
Theorem 1 may support the usual interpretation of the Walras equi-
librium. Suppose the replica economy which consists of a suffi-
ciently 'large number of consumers of the same type and suppose
that each agent of the same type bids the same price vector (s im!
ilarity of the bidd ing behaviour). Then this economy sati sfies the
regular property of Definition 5 and the Theorem 1 can be applied.
We must also consider the cases where coalitional behaviours
are allowed and the number of market participants is few. This is
an interesting investigation but it remains with future one.
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